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a society as this, but must be left rather\* to the solitary thinker and investigator. But, if we but faithfully fulfil this first part, I feel sure that we need not despair—nay, that we have the amplest grounds to hope—that at some time we may be able to see established, in a clear and consistent and cogent form, a religion in which both right and might shall be distinctly and fully combined, a religion in which all the best aspirations of our souls shall find satisfaction, and against which the gates of hell shall not prevail.

To say this, no doubt, does not amount to much, and it is very much easier to say it than to prove it; but this, at any rate, is all that I have to say at present.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

## THE CONSCIENCE.

### I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

To arrive at a series of statements, the validity of which no one in possession of his reasoning faculty can deny, is the aim of all science. In the abstract we may hold that the possibility of real scientific knowledge is by no means undeniable; the subjective element to be found in every perception has ever given rise to manifold doubts. What seems warm to me may seem cold to another; all the qualities we perceive in the object are nothing but its effects in the subject, and the belief that this perceiving subject is indefinitely variable is inconsistent with a rational belief in the possibility of science. If we assume the constancy of nature,—an assumption we

\* At least, must be left in the main. Perhaps we may say, with Goethe,—

“Zu erfinden, zu beschliessen,  
 Bleibe, Künstler, oft allein;  
 Deines Wirkens zu genießen,  
 Eile freudig zum Verein!  
 Hier im Ganzen schau', erfahre  
 Deinen eignen Lebenslauf,  
 Und die Thaten mancher Jahre  
 Gehn dir in dem Nachbar auf.”

shall not here criticise,—the possibility of science depends upon such a substantial identity among the various perceiving and reasoning individuals as will render the undeniable differences between them practically insignificant. This substantial identity we believe exists ; so great a uniformity prevails both in our senses and in the principles of our reason that individual differences may fairly be set aside. Not only can we say that when a given ray of light affects a normal eye, the man will have a sensation of something red ; but we can also say that the great majority of men have normal eyes, and that, therefore, the thing reflecting such a ray of light may properly be called red. Our certainty is almost absolute that when a mentally sound man knows that A is B and B is C, he will conclude that A is C ; and our belief is that almost all men are mentally sound, and that if any one will not acknowledge that A is C, his judgment has no weight. We hold it to be a fact that men cannot distinguish A from C, and at the same time regard A as identical with B, and B with C. The premises lead in the stream of our thoughts to the conclusion ; and they lead to it in such a coercive manner that we cannot reject the conclusion without surrendering the premises. Whenever our minds yield to this coercion and we think out the implications of our premises, we feel a pleasure of a distinct kind, which we call logical satisfaction ; otherwise we feel troubled, disconcerted, and logically unsatisfied. Our failure to think logically need not always be observed, or our attention may be drawn from it by other interests, in which case we shall not feel any logical uneasiness ; but the nature of the process is not thereby altered. The specific quality of those logical feelings is due essentially to the way in which the propositions are related in our own mind ; but it implies also the more or less distinct consciousness that in all minds they should be similarly related. In a contest about the correctness of a judgment, the parties do not appeal to the subjective fact that every man is supreme arbiter as to the quality of his ideas, and that it cannot be contested that he sees the thing as he sees it ; on the contrary, each party will be eager to show that the others have overlooked something which by

a more accurate investigation they might perceive, or that they have erred in their reasoning, and may discover their error by means of a little more patient and steady reflection. The weaker this expectation is, the weaker is our own assurance, or the stronger our belief that our opponent is mentally incompetent, and his opinions totally insignificant.

On its formal side, the possibility of science depends on the essential identity of the means by which men acquire knowledge. Yet it does not follow that the subjective differences, having turned out to have no importance in this relation, have none in other respects. These differences can themselves become the object of our reasoning. The physician not only treats different maladies in different ways; he must also take the individual factor into account, and apply a different treatment to different patients suffering from the same disease. This makes the medical art more difficult and uncertain, but it does not diminish the validity of the knowledge that a given disease requires a given treatment. We understand without difficulty that it is one thing to recognize a principle and another to apply it; and it may be a problem to ascertain how individual differences may modify a given process, although they may not have prevented our recognition of the general character of this process.

But in ethical discussions the case seems to be entirely different. The individual differences must here be regarded as realities, which affect the individual in the profoundest manner. Nevertheless, we maintain that they are of no more account in ethics than in natural science. We are not willing to let the principles of the moral life rest on the shifting foundation of personal temper; we are not satisfied with the discovery that a man with this or that character, desires, and faculties will do best to act in this or that manner, while a man of a different nature should follow other maxims. As we demand that all men whose opinions are to count should reason according to logical principles, so also we demand that they should act according to rules of universal validity if they are to be regarded as moral beings.

The individual factor plays nowhere so great a *rôle* as in our

feelings and volitions. How far a certain impression shall please or displease an individual depends so much on all his concrete qualities, the permanent as well as the momentary, that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to say whether a thing is pleasant or painful, and to what degree. Nevertheless, the feeling of pleasure or pain is a serious reality to him who feels it; and even if the whole world felt otherwise, the fact that he himself feels as he does would not be altered. It seems, therefore, altogether unreasonable to demand that a person under given circumstances shall feel in a certain manner, if we mean more by our demand than merely to say that a full inspection of the circumstance would produce in him the feeling we require. The fact that men can alter their character by self-culture, and thus learn to appreciate things they have hitherto disregarded, may justify a further extension of our demands; but even then it must be presupposed that motives can be aroused in these persons that will induce them to work for the improvement of their character. It is possible that the narrow-minded egoist, who has never experienced the pleasures of altruism, can by self-culture open his heart to these unknown emotions; but his motive in giving his life this new direction cannot be his appreciation of those unknown pleasures. Our simple demand that he acknowledge the higher pleasantness of unselfishness must remain to his mind entirely arbitrary. Repentance, the wish to have acted otherwise, or the determination to act otherwise in future, presupposes either that he has learned to judge his actions with fuller cognizance of their consequences, or that emotions which in the moment of action were not existent have taken possession of his mind.

The recognition of the great *rôle* which the subjective, variable element plays in the conduct of men, has given rise to the sceptical view of the moral life and of the problems of ethics,—a view which is strongly opposed to the eagerness with which every individual holds to his maxims and declares them to be valid, not only for himself at all times, but also for all other men. Moral life, it appears from this point of view, begins when a contrast arises between feelings of a durable,

compound, and representative kind, and those which, even if more intense, are of shorter duration. If our passions lead us to do anything which runs counter to our permanent feelings, these will regain their authority and revenge themselves by causing that anxiety and regret which we call a bad conscience. A life conformable to our durable feelings will reward us by giving us a feeling of inner satisfaction called good conscience. Moral science, it is further said from this point of view, can build upon no other ground than the principle that every man shall act in conformity with his most durable and ruling feelings, and make it the aim of his life to carry out these feelings consistently, and to subordinate to them all other emotions and instincts. But what this ruling factor shall be cannot be declared universally; every man is in this matter his own supreme judge, and if he acts, or rather judges his acts, in a manner consistent with his guiding principles, he cannot be further criticised. The consistent egoist cannot be refuted by any logical argument; the contest between him and the consistent altruist can be decided only by force,—the logic of life. Every moral system must begin with a subjective choice: the principle by which the particular acts are to be judged cannot be itself criticised. We may hope that evolution may eventually make altruistic feelings and universal sympathy the ruling principle of most men, and thus make universal happiness the conscious aim of their moral life. But it must not be forgotten that this is a mere question of fact. If evolution had led mankind in the direction of egoism, egoism would be their moral code; the egoist, who may still be found here and there, has not lost his “right” to live after his principles. Evolution may render egoism the moral theory of only a small minority; it cannot thereby disprove its logical claims as a possible moral system,—possible exactly by reason of these few exceptions.

At the first glance, every one will see in this theory something which stands in direct opposition to his natural view of the moral precepts. These precepts seem to be something to which we should conform, not something which should conform to us. The conscience, we believe, is placed in the midst

of our feelings and volitions,—not simply as their product, but as a power ruling over them, and claiming the exclusive right to pronounce whether they should be cultivated or suppressed. The most durable feeling is, of course, also a power ruling over the single momentary feelings ; but it would seem that in ethics the starting-point can never be the fact that our most durable feelings rule, but rather the demand that some one feeling and no other shall become the most durable and powerful. At first sight, the proposition that every consistent system is unassailable seems to be the giving up of ethics altogether. Unless we can show that the consistent egoist can be convicted in the court of morals, we had better dismiss as a mere phantom all that men have hitherto called conscience. We believe that it is not alone in individuals in whose minds altruistic feelings are already developed that conscience points to benevolent and generous actions ; we believe—at least such is the popular unscientific belief—that it can become the aim of conscience to lead the man whose heart by nature is cold and narrow to cultivate the germs of benevolence in his mind, until they grow up and become his ruling passion ; and if no germs of this kind can be found in his mind at all, we do not believe that such a man, by virtue of his strong and unalterable egoism, can be a conscientious man. We believe, on the contrary, that the more uninfluenced by altruistic emotions he is able to live, the more conscienceless he is. We are ready to acknowledge that the totally conscienceless man cannot be influenced by conscience ; but it would seem that the facts themselves forbid us to admit that it can be a matter of conscience to be selfish.

We stand here before the subject of this paper. On the one hand we see the possibility, be it real or merely theoretical possibility, that men may live as consistent egoists with untroubled inner satisfaction, and regard themselves as much wiser and more skilful than their neighbors whose hearts are moved by noble and generous feelings. On the other hand, we see the exquisite absurdity of admitting that any one's selfishness could be to him a matter of conscience,—a duty. The conscience is something which claims to be our ruling

power ; it is a particular kind of pleasure and pain felt in perceiving our own conformity or non-conformity to principle. But from this general statement, that the conscience must be the expression of something ruling in the mind, it does not at all follow that every passion that springs up and becomes the ruling power within us, becomes thereby the nucleus of our conscience.

It is around this point that the following reflections group themselves. The moral philosopher knows nothing *a priori*. If he arrives at conclusions directly opposed to ruling moral perceptions, we feel inclined to refuse our assent. We demand that the moral philosopher show us the legitimate basis of the principal moral precepts of daily life ; he must not alter their contents, but only connect them with other unquestionable facts. The moral precepts must be made the conclusion in a syllogism, the premises of which are otherwise shown to be valid. If the validity of the premises depend on the validity of the moral precepts, the whole process is worthless ; yet if other conclusions than the moral precepts should happen to follow from our premises, the conscientious man gives up not the moral precepts but the premises. Nothing can be good which is not true ; but there are certain elementary moral intuitions or customs which belong so much to the essence of our daily life that we feel sure there must be something wrong in what goes against them. Nevertheless, we cannot take these moral perceptions as our starting-point ; as objective commands they contain nothing from which the whole series of moral injunctions could be deduced. That murder is a crime cannot be the source of further deductions about things which are not included in the concept of murder.

There is but one thing which can be said of all moral precepts, fundamental or accidental : they cannot exist as moral precepts unless they can move the conscience. The conscience is a feeling of a particular kind : as hope, fear, love, hatred, joy, etc., are distinct feelings, so is conscience a feeling distinct from every other, and as such must have its own conditions under which it necessarily arises, and without which it never can arise. These conditions may be studied wherever con-



science exists, in wild tribes as well as among civilized peoples of our own age. For this purpose it makes no difference whether the commands of conscience are mistaken or legitimate. When we say that it is right to act so and so, we mean to say that the conditions under which the feeling of good conscience (or moral satisfaction) arises are undeniably contained in the acts. Whether the action is really right may be disputed ; but conscience never arises unless a man thinks he sees in the act something which, if it were actually to be found there, would justify that moral judgment. Beliefs held by individuals or by whole ages may seem wrong, upon a more accurate investigation or when the conditions are changed, and the dictates of conscience which spring from those beliefs will then seem wrong also. But the conditions necessary for the existence of conscience must be found in those cases also. Thus we may study as successfully the conditions of hope in cases where the individual hopes without reason, as in cases where he has good reasons for his confidence. Men have always thus discussed the reasonableness of their feelings, and we see no ground why the "right" of our moral perceptions should not be treated in the same manner. Whenever we say that we "ought" to act in a given way, we but declare that the conditions under which the conscience arises are actually to be found in this act.\* So far as I can see, the sciences of logic and æsthetics have already taken this course ; they study the conditions under which the particular feelings of logical and æsthetic pleasure arise, and then analyze the objective relations which really, and not by the mere fancy of the individual, contain these conditions. The science of ethics has but to follow the path indicated, and not to trouble itself with endless reflections concerning the possibility of a demonstration of the desirability of conscientious living.

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\* Mr. Sidgwick, with his usual clearness, has pointed out the special ethical meaning of the term "right" or "ought." He describes it as a compound of reason (objectivity) and feeling (see especially pp. 27-35 of the third edition of his "Methods of Ethics"). But we believe, nevertheless, that he is in fault where he says the term is unanalyzable ; some characteristic traits of Mr. Sidgwick's views may be explained by this definition.

## II. ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE.

The first question to be answered is, of course, whether the conscience (the feeling of moral satisfaction) is a particular feeling which can be described and distinguished from all other feelings. In our own mind we perceive a clear difference between the satisfaction called moral and all other feelings of satisfaction; but it may be questioned whether this feeling does not include a great variety of other more elementary feelings which are not the same in the individual at different times or in different individuals. Mr. Bain has given a picture of three stages in the evolution of the conscience,—a picture which most men cannot but find true.

“The infant conscience is the linking of terror with forbidden actions. A sentiment of love or respect towards the person of the superior infuses a different species of dread from that we have just supposed, the dread of giving pain to a beloved object. We call it a higher order of conscience to act from love than to act from fear. When the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is added, and the conscience is then a triple compound and begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear, the last ingredient being paramount in the maturity of the sympathies and the reason. . . . If the conscience is moulded principally upon the fear of punishment, the agony of remorse means simply the apprehension of the penalty incurred. . . . If love, esteem, and reverence enter largely into the case, the remorse will correspond to the suffering endured from inflicting a wound on those we love, respect, or venerate. If the duty prescribed has been approved by the mind as protective of the general interests of persons engaging our sympathies, the violation of this on our part affects us with all the pain that we feel from inflicting an injury upon those interests.” \*

It seems, then, according to Mr. Bain, that the compound of feelings which constitutes the conscience differs widely at various stages of evolution and in different persons. But the more we accentuate the different forms of conscience the more difficult becomes the question, why we give the same name of conscience to all these different forms. By studying the conscience in its three main forms, as Mr. Bain has described them, we may hope to discover the traits they have in com-

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\* A. Bain, “The Emotions and the Will,” Third edition, p. 286.

mon, and ascertain whether these are merely accidental similarities, or unveil the very essence of conscience.

The bad conscience or remorse shows itself very often as mere fear. But the fact must not be overlooked that not every kind of fear is called bad conscience. We can follow Mr. Bain and say that the conscience implies a relation to authorities. In all cases where the fear consists in the apprehension of the natural consequences of our actions we do not speak of remorse. A savage who has murdered one of a neighboring tribe will fear to be murdered himself in retaliation; but he will not feel remorse. The penalties which he incurs in transgressing the laws of his own tribe awake a fear which sometimes may be regarded as mere fear, sometimes as remorse or bad conscience. The peculiarities, by virtue of which a penalty is capable of arousing the latter kind of fear, must not be sought in those traits which it has in common with all other pains which men may fear. Neither can it be sought in the circumstances that the threatened pains are inflicted by other men, since the fear of the revenge of embittered enemies is not bad conscience. The explanation is, of course, to be sought in that which distinguishes a mere pain inflicted upon us from a penalty. The pain is a penalty when it is the sign of the displeasure of an authority,—*i.e.*, of some one who stands to us not as an enemy, but as an arbiter or judge. There must be a desire to have good and peaceful relations with the man who punishes before the individual can regard him as a judge, and feel his conscience moved by his displeasure. The original type of such an arbiter is a group of our fellow-men.

In itself, penalty is a very relative idea. We can punish another by inflicting upon him every kind of physical pain; we can also punish him by mockery and ridicule, or by avoiding his society. In such case the punishment consists in very different kinds of pain; their character as pain depends on very different relations between the man who punishes and the man who is punished. Physical sensibility to bodily pain is very different in different individuals; the mental pain, supposed to be given to our neighbor by avoiding him, will in many cases prove a mere illusion, its sole vitality being our

own belief that we have displeased him. If our neighbor does not at all desire to maintain good relations with us, he will not care about all this, which could affect him only by virtue of such an interest. The physical pain caused by blows, hunger, etc., is always pain, whatever its causes may be. But among civilized as among primitive nations, among adults as among children, experience shows us characters which are very heroic in enduring every kind of physical pain, and never desist from any purpose on account of the possibility of that kind of suffering, and yet tremble before the same pains when they are incurred as punishment of an offence committed. The only natural view must therefore be to explain this fear by the same causes as the fear of the mental pains above mentioned. In all cases the punishment may be defined as a pain inflicted by a natural manifestation of our fellow-men's displeasure,—*i.e.*, the inflicting of pain stands mainly as the sign or symbol of this displeasure. In a particular case it may be hard to determine the part which the apprehension of the pain and of the displeasure respectively play in the remorse felt by the guilty; but it may be set down as a ruling principle of our reasoning, that if equally disagreeable consequences, sprung from different causes, awake the same fear in our mind, this fear must be regarded as depending on the mere apprehension of these consequences. But if simple apprehension of suffering causes one feeling, and apprehension of the same suffering *due to other men's displeasure* causes a different feeling, this latter circumstance must be regarded as at least one of the principal causes of the particular character of the second feeling.

The bad conscience, as distinguished from fear of punishment, must, therefore, be defined as a feeling of uneasiness at having incurred the displeasure of other men. It follows that we cannot see any important difference between the first two stages of conscience pointed out by Mr. Bain. The second stage is distinguished by the exclusive supremacy of the feeling of annoyance at having displeased; it presupposes a greater mental evolution to perceive the displeasure of another man manifested merely as sorrow, distress, or avoidance of the

guilty, than if the displeasure were manifested in the more active form of anger. It may be a sign of less tender relations if fear rather than injured love or reverence becomes the characteristic trait in the expression of remorse; but common to both is the essential point that the necessary condition for the existence of remorse lies in perceiving another's displeasure, and in being painfully affected by this perception. One might think that this regard to the manner in which other men look upon our actions is the distinguishing trait only of the lower degrees of conscience. Conscience in its highest form, described by Mr. Bain as the inner authority, approves or disapproves without any regard whatsoever to the judgments of others, and draws its whole authority from the reflections and emotions of the self-reliant individual. Mr. Sidgwick\* has called it a crucial experiment, making against the theory that the conscience consists in sympathy with the feelings of others, that we in our conscience may hold to be right what is condemned by the whole world. If this were granted, it would apply also to our own theory; but we think Mr. Sidgwick has not carried his analysis to the bottom of the question. The inner authority as the highest independent form of conscience is a conscience which, whether rightly or wrongly, actually holds that regard for our fellow-beings, ought to be the mainspring of all our actions. The independence claimed by the individual cannot, therefore, be said to be indifference to the effect of our actions upon the interests of others,—it can only mean that in the valuation of our actions we do not care whether others are, in fact, pleased or displeased; we form our own subjectively uninfluenced and objectively impartial opinion, whether they have reason or not to be pleased or displeased with our conduct. The independence of the conscience, resting on inner authority, signifies only our logical independence of the opinions of the world. Whether the thinker's arguments gain general assent or not, he still holds to them; his failure to convince the world may incite him to a repeated and more diligent examination; he may doubt

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\* "Methods of Ethics," p. 29.

about his skill as a writer, etc. ; but if all his care cannot show him any fault in his premises or in his conclusions, and if at the same time he can see the reasons why the world has not been brought to understand him, then he will maintain his opinions against the whole world, and be convinced that the time will come when they will be universally admitted, or, if such a time should never come, he will point to some permanent cause of the universal delusion. This is also the case with the convictions of the conscience. Just as the ignorant can, without difficulty, be made to retract their opinions, if any one contradicts them, since their confidence in their maxims reposes mainly on the authority of the world and not on first-hand observation of the facts, so our conscience depends at first on the actual effects of our acts upon others. But gradually as our knowledge augments, and our mental firmness and experience increase, we may outgrow this dependence. No authority in the world can persuade us that we have done what we surely know we have not done, and the loudest disapproval becomes incapable by itself of convincing us that we have done anything which can be a legitimate reason for such an outburst of displeasure. In itself the inner authority does not signify more than this : that the man is guided by his own insight as to what constitutes a valid ground for the censures of his fellow-men. We do not think that sympathy is the source of our moral convictions, because we cannot see that sympathy is requisite to form an idea of the feelings of other men ; but that sympathy is not the source of our moral convictions, because our ethics may be contrary to the opinions of the world,—this we cannot grant to Mr. Sidgwick until he has shown that the ideal to which our conscience refers has not been abstracted from the real world. We maintain that our conscience may become independent of the real existing opinions of the world by a mental representation of the ideal opinions of others ; it is merely required that this representation shall be formed by a consistent construction according to principles, the validity of which may be pointed out in the same world to which the construction brings us in opposition.

The whole difference between the lower and the higher degrees of conscience, accordingly, consists in the different degree of diligence and accuracy with which the person who acts conceives the sentiments of the persons affected by his action. That this is true of our existing conscience every one can see; but the question is whether this must always be the case. This is the cardinal point of our whole paper. Altruism is actually the content of our ethics to-day; but does the conscience command us so to act because the altruistic emotions have grown stronger within us, or have we gradually learned to cultivate these emotions because the conscience has declared them to be satisfying? Undoubtedly altruism is the form of conduct best calculated to be appreciated by others; every motive which invites us to take notice of our fellow-men must develop into altruism, either as a means or as an end. But the question is whether such motives are or are not in themselves altruistic feelings.

We must distinguish between the feeling of pleasure which accompanies every satisfied inclination and the pleasure we feel in perceiving that a given inclination has grown powerful in our soul. If our heart is moved by generous feelings, it is a pleasure to help our brother; and in many cases our pleasure in helping is but a sign of the existence of such feelings. But side by side with this emotion there may be also a lively pleasure at finding altruistic feelings ruling over us,—that is to say, not only may we live exclusively in our emotions, but we may also make them the object of a judgment, which approves them and our character on their account; and this judgment is also accompanied by a feeling. That the conscience is a feeling of the latter kind may be taken for granted; but the conscience is one thing if altruism, as our most permanent emotion, approves the single altruistic inclinations, and it is another thing if altruism itself must be judged by another powerful motive in our soul, the expression of which we find in our conscience. And here we repeat what we have already pointed out above: if it is but the most permanent instinct which, through the conscience, stands as the arbiter of all other motives and judges them according as they agree or

disagree with it, every harmonized life must be regarded as a conscientious life. A person able to live a thoroughly selfish life should not only feel an undisturbed satisfaction, regarding his more generous neighbors as fools (about which there is no theoretical difference), but he should also be said to have a good conscience. But this can never be granted. Such a man is simply conscienceless. He can never regard his selfishness as a duty. And what shall we say if our soul stands wavering between conflicting inclinations? Whence comes it that it is just when selfishness is gaining the ascendancy over our integrity and altruism that we feel our conscience troubled? Why can we never look at our integrity and altruism as the disturbers to be combated, and why can we never feel it a matter of conscience to cultivate our egoism? The argument that altruism is too deeply implanted in our hearts for us ever to become perfect egoists is of no value. For if it is true that all men at times are influenced by altruism, it is even truer that egoism is so deeply implanted in us that we can never eradicate it altogether or cease to feel pain when its claims are disregarded. Mr. Spencer explains the connection between conscience and altruism by the ascendancy which the more far-seeing motives have gradually gained over those which correspond to immediate and extrinsic effects. As will appear hereafter, we agree in the essential points with Mr. Spencer; but this does not concern us as yet, because his theory does not explain the character of the conscience as a psychological fact, but only its emotional power. It is one thing to examine the causes which give to the conscience its ascendancy in our soul, and another to search for the traits which distinguish it from all other mental facts; and here we are as yet exclusively occupied with the latter investigation.

If we compare moral satisfaction and dissatisfaction with satisfaction and dissatisfaction of any other kind, we shall find the difference to lie in this: that in the first case we are convinced that other men cannot help finding valid reasons to be pleased or displeased with our conduct, while in the other cases we have no such conviction. The egoist may feel himself happier with his ill-gotten riches for not sharing them



with his friends ; he is the sole competent judge of the value of his own feelings. But he cannot help admitting that other men have good reason to wish he were of a different disposition. This concession is purely logical, and springs from the very nature of our thinking. Whether the concession shall be more than a logical one, and gain power over our will, that is just the question whether we shall be conscientious or not. There can be no question that it is to the intellectual element that we must appeal for the explanation of the particular character of the conscience. The *dilettante*, without the faculty to become a great artist, the only thing he desires with all the energy of his mind, may take a dislike to living ; but however painful a reality these broken illusions may be to him, he can never see more in them than the expression of his own subjective accidental constitution ; and this not merely because he sees many who live well and happy without being artists, for such he might regard as prosaic natures, having no voice in the matter at all,—but because he can never convince himself that his being unable to become a great artist should give others any reason to be dissatisfied with him. On the contrary, if conscience speaks it will tell him that a ground for dissatisfaction would be found rather in that disheartened grief over the genius he misses, which hinders him from cultivating the useful faculties he may still possess. Individual peculiarities determine wherein a person shall seek his happiness ; but what his fellows shall value does not depend on these peculiarities. And experience shows that in all cases where we speak of conscience, a judgment has been passed upon our value to others.

Two causes very often interfere with this analysis. One is, that the motive-pleasure (*i.e.*, the pleasure caused by satisfying our inclination) and the judgment which determines the moral worth of the motives do not always take place at different times, but often are mingled together in the most inextricable manner. The other cause is, that the moral worth of a motive may have been perceived so often that the past appreciation quite instinctively determines our present judgment. Therefore it may be hard in a particular case to

determine the part the motive-pleasure plays in our whole mental situation, and what the pleasure of the appreciation may account for. We must eventually perceive that if mere fear keeps us from actions which injure others, this by itself will give them a good reason to be displeased with us ; whereas every warm-hearted feeling which directly impels us to care for others' welfare, increases our worth in their eyes. Any sign that such a motive needs to be supported by the distinct consciousness of the approval of others, lowers our own estimate of ourselves, and shows us to be imperfectly developed ; any sign that our sympathetic emotions have their full development becomes on the contrary a source of augmented pleasure. We are tempted, therefore, to ascribe to our benevolent emotions a motive power which probably they possess only by virtue of our consciousness of their value ; and the pain which we directly feel in acting against them comes thus to stand for the whole content of remorse. We overlook the fact that behind this pain, behind its permanence and the complete submission with which we bend before it, there lies a judgment of its rightfulness, a judgment which can never be applied to our egoistic emotions, however bitterly we may repent having set them aside. Mr. Spencer's hypothesis \* that the conscience, as the sense of duty, or moral obligation, may be regarded as transitory, and that it will diminish as fast as moralization increases, we regard as totally erroneous. What increasing morality will achieve is the diminution of the number of cases where remorse is reasonably felt ; but never can an instinctive mechanism become so perfect as to render a distinct consciousness of its excellence superfluous. There must always remain at least a dim abstract idea of our inclinations being obeyed because they are right, and not because they are strong. If we will not reason against clear experience, which proves that it can never be a felt duty to extirpate benevolent emotions, we must agree that it cannot be their quality as ruling permanent inclinations which connects them with the conscience ; for selfish inclinations may also gain ascendancy over our

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\* "The Data of Ethics," 1881, p. 127.

minds. The conscience does not announce how great a power these inclinations have already gained within us; it tells us, on the contrary, that they alone have a right to become powerful. The solid basis on which we wish to build the principles of our life can never be found by considering the number of individuals who are pleased as we are at having benevolent inclinations. In matters of scientific investigation a majority will not do. If there is not universality there is uncertainty. What mankind will feel happy in doing cannot be stated in any general, objectively valid way; but we may show with sufficient accuracy what rules of conduct men would be glad to see others follow towards them. Now, as all cases where the conscience appears have this trait in common, that the action commended is believed to be universally pleasing, and as this trait can never disappear without the character of conscience disappearing also, we must conclude that the conscience is always a state of feeling connected with the idea of what others should reasonably be pleased to see us do towards them.

The three stages in the evolution of conscience, which Mr. Bain has pointed out, are nothing but different ways in which we may gain the conviction that our character and behavior are reasonably satisfying or dissatisfying to others; these stages do not mark at all the essential points in the psychological mechanism by which the conscience arises. The conscience, as we have described this feeling, has but two forms,—good and bad conscience. The bad conscience is the painful consciousness of others' well-founded dissatisfaction. The good conscience may be merely the absence of bad conscience,—the peaceful slumber of a mind no enemy has as yet disturbed,—or it may be the conscious happiness of having no reason for remorse, or, finally, it may be the self-conscious noble feeling of pride in facing the ill-founded displeasure of others. It is worth noticing that language expresses positively the command that the wrong-doer shall repent; but restricts itself to telling the good man that he has no cause for repentance, and to directing his fellow-men to honor and to value him. As in almost all cases, so here language shows its fine

tact; for if the good conscience transgressed the limits of its negative character it would run the risk of becoming a feeling of haughtiness, which is not at all laudable, but rather injurious to the community.

### III. THE GROWTH OF THE CONSCIENCE.

Among the many opinions of men, some seem to us well founded and others absolutely absurd; and it is not always the latter that are the less powerful. But be that as it may, we feel assured that no one has ever been logically satisfied with an opinion unless it has presented itself to him as merely a statement of fact, or as a clear consequence from true propositions. The briefest experience compels us to acknowledge that the logical worth of an opinion is not the only thing which gives it value to the individual; a particular set of circumstances is required before the logical aspect of things can become a centre of interest for mankind. The motive-power behind all our science is the instinct of self-preservation; our instinct of curiosity is but a derivation from that more elementary instinct, and our logical interests are connected with this instinct to know. In other words, we distinguish between the conditions of logical satisfaction—*i.e.* the perfect harmony of our several opinions—and the conditions of its emotional strength,—*i.e.* its connection with the desire to know, and thereby with the struggle for life.

Similarly, it is necessary to distinguish between the conditions which give the conscience its specific character and the conditions which give this feeling its commanding influence over the soul. A great many feelings besides the conscience may determine the man, so that a particular set of circumstances is required to give the conscience the pre-eminence. The foregoing pages have shown that the idea of others having good reason to approve our actions is the necessary condition of the birth of conscience; but what are the causes that give it increasing strength? Before we go on to the examination of this subject, one remark will not be superfluous. The conscience may acquire a seemingly intrinsic worth, just as the logical interest has apparently lost its con-

nection with the instinct of self-preservation. The thinker does not stand in the midst of the struggle for life. When this struggle is most bitter, free and far-reaching, thought may be impossible. But the first impulse to scientific investigation is, nevertheless, given by the instinct of self-preservation, and it is only its utility that has given, and still gives, thought its value. Since mankind has profited by the existence of thoughtful and intelligent men, institutions have been founded for the cultivation of logical interests; a living, and the possibility of honors and fame, are offered to the inquirer, and a conception has grown up of the ideal worth of scientific labors. In such an environment, formed by the evolution of society, the interest in scientific investigation may spring up in an individual mind as the mere disinterested pleasure in clearness and consistency, or as the love of discovery. But if this interest turned out to be useless for society as a whole, this *milieu*, this hot-house of thoughts, would disappear; and if the pursuit of science in the long run proved disadvantageous to the individual, scholars would become rare. We make this remark, so that it may be clear that what follows is not intended to describe the growth of conscience in every particular individual, but to point out the conditions which make its growth in the community at large comprehensible. We make no secret of our opinion that the direct correlation between the growth of the general and individual conscience is closer than is commonly believed; yet the ability to analyze one's own mind is so rare that we may fairly keep the distinction between the two things.

Language has the terms praiseworthy and shameful to designate the feeling of its being proper or not to please or displease other men. The isolated man stands in the midst of a world that operates without reference to his wishes; he may form ideas that describe this world accurately or inaccurately; he may distinguish between realizable and fanciful ideals; but he can never form any idea of the praiseworthiness or shamefulness of his actions. The isolated man may have permanent and changing passions; he may feel a vivid displeasure if he yields thoughtlessly to one of the transitory

impulses, but he cannot feel remorse or shame. Life in common with other beings, our equals, may be of great value as a help in distinguishing true opinions from false; the collective labor of so many persons procures a larger sum of experiences, which form a more solid basis for the distinction between accidental subjective guesses and opinions conformable to the objective world. In principle, however, this life in society is not necessary to the distinction between realities and fancies, because the difference between them depends on that between imagination and perception. But life in society is the absolutely indispensable condition of the distinction between praiseworthy and blamable acts. Such terms have meaning only by virtue of a real or thought relation to other men. The idea is a comparison between essentially co-ordinate factors. The isolated man finds in all nature nothing to which he can compare himself, nothing he could feel pride to surpass or shame to be inferior to. The conscience is not absolutely coextensive with these feelings of pride or shame, but it is a case of such feeling. The conscience is always connected with sensitiveness to praise and blame. We have pointed out already what is required before this sensitiveness becomes conscience; it is the idea that our fellow-men have good reason to praise or blame us. Very often the shame we instinctively feel is far more powerful than the conscience; but in the end it will be the latter which will gain the supremacy in our minds because it acts through our intellectual powers, whereas the first is a mere impulse. The distinction between remorse and shame may therefore be practically admissible, but the psychological structure of the two emotions is, nevertheless, the same.\* It is our aim to show that, as in former times, speculative truths were considered to be truths of a nobler and higher kind than empirical statements; so it is yet a secret but erroneous opinion that disinterested feelings possess a greater worth than interested feelings, and this opinion leads

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\* Mr. Stephens has not, so far as I am aware, been happy in his exposition of the relation between shame and conscience, because he has not perceived that the "rightful" is that which gives *others* good reason to be pleased with our actions. Stephens, "Science of Ethics," 1882, p. 319.

us mistakenly to look for the conscience in the immanent pleasure of benevolence, or the immanent repulsion of cruelty or indecency. We are persuaded that these moral sentiments have acquired and still retain their emotional power as elements of the conscience through the associated idea of being praiseworthy or blamable, and that the only possible foundation of a solid moral theory must be sought in this circumstance.

We shall give only a short analysis of that sensibility to respect and contempt which may almost be said to be constitutional in the human mind.

Respect and contempt reveal themselves in our behavior, and may have useful or pernicious consequences for the object that inspires them. It is an obvious fact that men court respect and avoid contempt, as in everything else they pursue what is agreeable. Every sign of respect consequently pleases, and every sign of contempt irritates and alarms. But—and we believe this to be an important point—these emotions may have a very indefinite character, because the advantages of being respected and the discomforts of being held in contempt are themselves of a very indefinite and manifold kind. If respect or contempt was absolutely without consequences for its object, we should be totally indifferent to it: it affects the human mind by virtue only of its consequences. If the particular consequences of the emotions of others could be distinctly perceived in each case, their emotions would affect us merely with hope or fear for just those consequences. The vagueness of the consequences, the impossibility of forming a definite idea of them beforehand, makes it possible to think that our sensibility to respect and contempt has an immanent character, and is absolutely independent of their particular circumstances. This immanent sensibility, however, is nothing but sensibility to our abstract idea of the consequences which respect and contempt commonly have.

Every one who is the object of respect and reverence may feel a general security, and confidence that he will meet with no hinderance from his fellows; but he may follow his impulses and work for the accomplishment of his desires. The despised

will have a general feeling of being isolated and obstructed in all his doings. Now, whenever our mental processes take a free course, we feel a pleasure of a very massive kind; and it is a pleasure of this kind that the respected man secures. If, on the contrary, all the powers of our soul are paralyzed, if we can never give ourselves up to the thought that fills us, but feel in every way oppressed, the most acute pain takes possession of the soul; and this is the case with the despised; their best-laid schemes go wrong. The opinions of our fellow-men are one of the means by which we judge the validity of our own opinions; respect and contempt manifest the judgments of others upon us; and, therefore, the thought of being respected or despised may affect us not only with hope or fear of the consequences, but directly, by modifying the feeling of security and confidence with which we pursue our several aims.

There are, however, various conditions which must be fulfilled before the feeling of confidence or of helplessness can take possession of the mind. The individual must feel impelled to work in the direction in which he finds the way open; otherwise the attitude of others is indifferent to him. But it may happen, on the other hand, that the discovery of our own ability to deal with a problem, hitherto lying out of our way, may suddenly produce a vivid interest in that problem. The vain endeavor to solve a problem has similarly a tendency to cool our interest; the pain of eventual defeat is prevented if we cease to strive; and we therefore easily give up willingly what we find to be impossible. It is pleasant to feel one's power, and, therefore, every free activity endures and increases. We believe that the interest in a profession, although it often springs from what we call an innate taste for its work, may in most cases be explained by the manifold forgotten experiences of success in dealing with its problems. In time, as the man goes deeper into his art or science, he may discover that he is incapable of mastering what is highest and most difficult in it; and this discovery often drives him into another profession. Circumstances may make such a change impossible, and if he is blessed with a happy disposition he



resigns his ambition and ceases to aim at the unattainable. But often he will never lose the painful consciousness of inferiority; his attention will be fixed on what he cannot do rather than on what he can, and he will feel his life to be a failure. Satisfaction is all the harder to gain the more those professions to which our powers are suited lack all other attractions; and the more external advantages those have for which we are unfit, the more likely we are to make new and unhappy experiments, and to be tormented in consequence by the sense that we are good for nothing.

Respect and contempt, we say, are signs that we are secure from external hinderance or exposed to it. They may stand either as authoritative indications of our ability, in which case respect will increase our confidence in ourselves, or else as direct signs of our success or failure in winning the favor of others. We take no notice of the judgment of persons who in our eyes are incapable of judging our professional attainments, or with whom we do not care to maintain close relations. Every one has a circle of interests and an idea of the capacity of his various critics; and every one has a circle of persons with whom he wishes to keep on good terms. Yet we are all tempted to make intelligent judges of those who admire us, and to see desirable friends in those who honor us; we very quickly set down those who find fault with us as ignorant and worthless. Individual characters differ widely in this respect. One man yields willingly to the opinions of others; a second will fight by himself and follow his own ideas. These different characters may themselves be judged worthy of honor or contempt; but they have in other ways nothing to do with the structure of the conscience.

Respect and contempt, we have thus seen, may be produced by our abilities or by the relation in which they put us to our fellow-men. The conscience is exclusively bound up with this relation. The deepest foundation of society must be sought in the feeling of greater security and order which comes with social life; the isolated man can never concentrate the whole energy of his mind to a single end, he must at every moment be watching events; his attention is dispersed, and his life

insecure. In time there will consequently arise a general instinctive comprehension of the value of a mutual understanding; and the man whose passions and appetites bring him into frequent conflict with others, who is indifferent to the pleasures of peace and thinks the sacrifice it involves too great,—such a man will not follow his conscience but his appetites. When the desire to live in peace and to sleep in security takes possession of the mind, the conscience arises and becomes the judge of all our particular inclinations. What we shall then ask of our emotions is whether they entitle us to the respect or contempt of other men. We explain the higher value which we attribute to the noble passions of benevolence and justice not to some immanent, undefinable prerogative, but to an undeniable worth in the eyes of others. When we cultivate them we gain a greater feeling of security, and, therefore, we are pleased at discovering their first faint apparition. We cultivate and foster them, not for their own sake, but for the sake of our conscience. The insight that the worth of these noble feelings increases, if they rule us without assistance from the distant consciousness of their moral value, has led to the mistaken notion that the conscience is not the judge of these feelings, but their expression, or the voice by which they themselves judge our other passions. But we think the distinction is very obvious between the moment of action, when we are moved by benevolence and the sense of justice, and the cooler moments of meditation when we judge of the value of these motives by deciding whether they deserve the respect or the contempt of the world.

From the earliest times man has felt himself bound to life in society. We shall not here discuss how men were originally driven to live together; we assume society as a fact, and the condition without which conscience could never have arisen. Every one acquainted with primitive forms of life will have remarked how the limits of the tribe are also the limits of the individual's hopes and fears. In the company of his tribesmen the savage will play and chatter in joyful ease; but as soon as he finds himself alone he is the prey of constant fear, and nothing is more dreadful to him than to be expelled from

his tribe and left to face alone the vague dangers of the forest. The clan and its ideals are the absolute guide of the primitive man; they are the necessary support without which he loses all his ordinary good qualities. The same creature who in combat is courageous, and heroically endures the cruel tortures of revengeful enemies, becomes timid and trembles before the blame of his companions. The same is true of the child; the family circle is his world, and he cannot bear the loss of it. Praise and blame are probably the most effective instruments of education, and, in most families, it is a common experience that the first germs of sympathy and tender emotion which the child shows are cultivated by praise, and by signs of admiration and increased love. Just so primitive peoples educate their youth by praising the child's attempts to imitate the feats which are to be the work and glory of his manhood.

As the primitive man will fight against the whole world, if he has the respect and esteem of his own group; as the child feels safe and undisturbed, if he has the approval of his parents, so the religious man may set his whole mind to God, and with that support be enabled to bear the disappointments of life, and even the contempt and hatred of his fellow-men. It may be that the prosperity which God promises him makes him insensible to the short and insignificant chances of this earthly existence, or he may believe that all goods gained in opposition to God are turned into so many evils. Be this as it may, God is to him as a king above the kings of this world, and his society a society above that of men. Where our relations with God are not settled, no security at all is to be expected. We shall not here attempt to solve religious problems; we only urge that as primitive society is kept together by the manifold evidences which daily life affords, that only in society can the individual lead a life of relative security and count upon the fruits of his labors,—so religious feelings have gained and preserved their power because daily life, in a real or imaginary manner, shows that only the religious man truly prospers. Social life, and a regard to the wishes of others, becomes the centre of the individual's interests as a consequence of merely egoistic experiences, not kept distinct

by memory, but moulded into the more abstract shape of sensitiveness to respect and contempt. And the case is the same with the religious feelings. What other men have good reason to respect or despise becomes the content of our conscience ; what God sees reason to command or forbid we feel bound by the conscience to do or to forbear. The cultivation of our social instincts may be a command of God, but the culture of our religious feelings may also be a social duty. All that can be said of man and society can be said also of man and God, since man's relations to God are nothing but a new kind of society.

Religion, we believe, has been a most effective means of aiding the growth of the conscience, especially with regard to its capital point,—viz., independence of the real relations between the individual and his neighbors. It has done this by constituting a society by the side of, or rather above, the real human society. The most important question to which the moral philosopher has to give an answer is this : How it comes about that the conscientious man does not care about the actual respect or contempt he meets with, but either follows his own views as to what is right and wrong, without regard to the criticisms of others, or if he notices these, does so in a way which seems to make them a mere metaphor,—*i.e.* he reflects upon what their criticism "ought" to be. In the foregoing pages we have found the content of this metaphorical word "ought" to consist in our sensitiveness to the idea of what other people have good reason to think of us. This sensitiveness we think we have explained, by referring it to the fact that our sensitiveness to respect and contempt is the general, probably abstract, expression of the feeling with which others may regard us and our behavior. Respect and contempt may mingle with many other emotions, such as love and hatred ; but they are in themselves more neutral, and, therefore, better suited to characterize the indefiniteness of the hopes and fears with which we look upon our relations to the surrounding society. Mental security, calmness, and confidence on the one hand, and mental restlessness, with want of security in the pursuit of our daily labors on the other, are, as

we have seen, the fruits of good or bad relations with our fellow-men. It remains to show how this sensitiveness, very intelligible in itself, may become connected with an idea indispensable to the emergence of conscience, the idea of what our relation to society would actually be if the reality conformed to the ideal.

A mind indifferent to the respect and contempt of others, and a mind caring only for what the feelings of others actually are, are alike devoid of conscience. Characters cast in a robust mould may feel inclined to combat every one who comes in their way, and they easily become enemies of society; while weaker natures may yield to every outburst of the world's temper, and be unhappy unless they can conform to the ruling fashion. It is generally supposed that the latter persons possess a kind of conscience in their weak sensibility; but in fact they are nothing but timid creatures, and were it not for the faculty of suggestion—if we may use the phrase—by which they so easily persuade themselves that what they happen to hear at the moment is the eternal truth, we should never think we saw any analogy to conscience in their sensitiveness to public opinion. Some strength and firmness of mind may be required to become a conscientious man, because conscience must be independent of the actual and momentary judgments of the world. But there are other considerations, much more powerful than this, which lead men to disregard convictions which have not been firmly rooted in their minds.

We have already remarked that as men are naturally inclined to avoid what is disagreeable, they easily find their interest cooling towards any circle in which they are not esteemed, since thus the pain which such disregard causes is diminished. Everything has a great chance of becoming ultimately pleasant which increases the feeling of our mental worth, our mental calmness, and our unshaken security. In time, as the structure of society differentiates, there will be on the one hand greater scope for obtaining external signs of respect, and on the other greater experience of the precariousness and difficulty of such an undertaking. The respect and

worldly happiness actually gained do not always go with inward worth. The flatterer and the sycophant may win success, blind fate may heap riches upon the ignorant, while proud genius consumes its energy in vain efforts. But these are chances which cannot be counted upon, and serious effort must build upon a more solid basis to succeed. Proverbs and myths suggest themselves, such as that man is master of his fate, that worth is measured not by success, but by desert; there arises a belief that the accidental separation of happiness and virtue cannot be ultimate; a thousand experiences support the hope in a future; life is not spent in a day, and its evening is often more just than its morning, and very frequently patient endurance in the time of misery is the condition of the happiness of the after-days. Sometimes men fill out the uncertainties of experience with the hope of a transcendent happiness. The experiences of life may possibly not teach that "honesty is the best policy," but we believe they do, and that men on the whole profit more by being independent characters than by conforming to a shifting public opinion; but we must acknowledge there are exceptions, and no one can be sure that his life will not be one of them. Therefore, men need some further sanction than the experience of the utility of duty; and this sanction has been sought in the belief in the eternal happiness of heaven. The human content of this belief, the sanction men need beyond the general experience of the utility of being independent of the accidental opinions of the day, may be found in the two following circumstances. At first it may seem doubtful whether an individual, in his particular circumstances, has not the best chance of prospering by flattery and sycophancy; but it is clear that persons who follow their own best convictions, and do not fluctuate like restless waves, are better friends and more trustworthy companions. Therefore our conscience must require us to be independent of the shifting opinions of the day, since only thus can we become fit objects of respect for our fellow-men. And our second remark must be, that when the average experience of life has been that such independence is the soundest basis on which to build our lives, it is implicitly

made impossible to be confident of success in following other courses. The pleasure of felt harmony with the society about us consists mainly in the tendency it has to increase the volume and freedom of all our mental activities. But when we win respect without reason we can put but small reliance on its permanence, and can hardly keep away the anxiety for what the next moment will bring forth. But this anxiety diminishes the pleasure of being respected, if it does not totally abolish it. A harmony between ourselves and others which rests on a misunderstanding cannot produce in our mind the serene calmness we aspire to ; but there is no impossibility of attaining this state of mind where we stand in real conflict with others, if only we are fully convinced that the conflict arises from their misconceptions. Therefore, man has no choice ; if he wishes to attain that calmness of mind which is the condition of the undisturbed growth of all other pleasures and of happiness, he must be true to his own inmost convictions.

The terms we use have some ambiguity, but it is of a trifling kind. The conscience, we have said, is our sensibility to what others have good reason to think about us. A good reason, as we have meant it in this paper, is one founded upon the real, fully perceived character of our actions, and in our full apprehension of the laws according to which men are pleased or displeased. But if this is so, it is a mere tautology to say that experience must teach us that it is safer to build upon what gives others good reason to be satisfied with us than upon what makes them actually satisfied at the moment. Men may be kept in their illusion for a time, but it is the essence of an illusion to be a transient conviction. We cannot tell at what precise moment the illusion will be dispelled ; but a perpetual illusion is a contradiction in terms. The moral code, we say, is the whole sum of our experience, accumulated and sifted through the ages, of what constitutes a good reason why our fellow-men should be satisfied or dissatisfied with us. Shifting circumstances, new conditions of life, may alter the code, and these changes may not go on without conflicts. The conscience is our consciousness of conformity to this code, or to that part of it which has impressed our intelligence ; and

this consciousness is but our nature's instinctive demand for a support, a firm foundation on which we may rely in the performance of the manifold particular undertakings which make up our individual lives.

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## DISCUSSIONS.

### DR. ADLER ON MORAL INSTRUCTION.

Dr. Adler's introductory lecture on "The Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction"\* seems to me to beg a very large question, viz., whether school or any other children, or even grown-up persons, can be efficaciously instructed in morals. Perhaps, however, Dr. Adler meant to leave this big question on one side, and to set himself to the smaller problem: granted the efficacy of moral instruction, by what method is this instruction to be conveyed? The illustration he gives of his proposed method seems to me the reverse of happy. His enumeration of the degrees of the lie—the lie direct, the lie equivocal, the lie partial, the lie pantomimic, the *suggestio falsi*—is very ingenious, but as a lesson to a child is full of immoral suggestion. Unless we are to believe that the child is a very paragon of original sin, a perfect original sinner in Aristotelian phrase; unless we are to assume that its heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, is it not a crime to suggest to the child the existence of a depravity which there is even a chance is not there?

In physical exercises, the right action is repeated again and again, until it becomes habitual; the wrong one is simply excluded. To attempt to exhaust all the possible varieties of wrong action would be worse than a waste of time; it would confuse the little brains and obscure the right action. Imagine a course of systematic lessons on Dr. Adler's plan in

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